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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID S.

GROW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

MARWICK DEVELOPMENT, INC . ,
et al. ,

Defendants-Respondents,
and
BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Intervenor-Respondent.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT DAVID S. GROW

Case No. 16675

~~~~~~~~~~~~~·)

A statement of the nature of this case, its disposition
in the district court, the relief Appellant seeks on appeal and
a statement of facts, are all set forth in Appellant's Brief
on file herein.

This Reply Brief is submitted for the purpose

of answering the matters raised in Respondents' Brief and reiterating the arguments which compel a reversal of the Summary Judgment.
The short-forms used herein have the meaings set forth in Appellant's
Brief.
POINT I
APPENDIX "A" OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IS NOT PART OF THE
~ORD ON APPEAL AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.

Pursuant to Rule 75(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Appellant designated the entire record made in the lower court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to be included in the record on appeal herein.

.)
86
Respondents have at no time objected to the completeness of
the record.

(R. 235_

Nor did they comp lain in the lower court about the '

adequacy or accuracy of the record.
Rule 75(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that:
If anything material to either party is omitted
£:-om the record on appeal by error or accident or is
misstated therein, the parties by stipulation or
the district court, either before or after th~ record ,
is transmitted to the Supreme Court, or the Supreme
Court, on a proper suggestion or of its own initiative
may direct that the omission or misstatement shall '
be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental
record shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk
of the district court.
Although Respondents have made no attempt to follow the required
procedures set forth in Rule 7 5 (h) , they seek now to supplement
the record on appeal with a preliminary title report which was
neither included nor even referred to in the record proper and
which has not been certified as part of the record on appeal.
The document is not authenticated, is inadmissablible hearsay, ar:
is presented in a way that affords no opportunity to test its
accuracy or completeness.
It is clear that Respondents' submission to the Court
of documents not contained in the record on appeal is improper,
notwithstanding their attempt to cloak such impropriety with the
· 1 aimer:
·
label "Appendix " an d t h e d isc
supplement the record on appeal."

"Boardwalk does not wish to

(Respondents' Brief, p.8.)

Jn

964
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 U.2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1 ),a
. h
transcript.
party sought to supp 1 emen t th e reco rd on appeal wit a
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of testimony received after the appeal had been taken.

The trans-

cript was simply brought and left with the clerk of the Supreme

' court.

In ruling that the transcript could not be considered by

the court in resolving the matter on appeal, the Supreme Court
referred to Rule 7 5 (h) and explained as follows:
No order has been made authorizing this transcript ~o be made part of the record on appeal. Nor
could it properly have been. The appeal is from
and is limited to the proceedings in the district
court upon which the judgment is based. The rule
referred to contemplates that any addition to the
record be part of that proceeding, and does not
authorize bringing in anything other than that
record. It requires but a moment's reflection to
realize what a chaotic situation would exist if
after a judgment is entered and an appeal taken,
the parties could keep on having supplemental
proceedings, adducing new evidence, and forwarding
the transcripts to the Supreme Court. The illogic
and irregularity of attempting to do so is so
obvious that further comment as to its impropriety
is unnecessary.
Id. at 413-14 (footnotes omitted).

In Nelson v. State Tax Commission, 506 P.2d 473 (Utah
1973), the Supreme Court again had occasion to rule upon the

propriety of submitting new documentary evidence on appeal.

The

appellant in that case had obtained a stipulation from respondent
that certain documentary evidence could be included in the record
on appeal, even though it had not been introduced or made part of

the record in the lower court proceedings.

The Supreme Court

cited Tucker Realty in holding that:
[T]here is no indication whatsoever that [the
document] is or was part of the record. We therefore
cannot properly so regard it any more than we coul~
any other extraneous document which someone may bring
in and lodge with this court.

!!!_. at 440.
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The irregularity and impropriety of Respondents'

back.
handed attempt to circumvent both Rule 7 5 (h) and the holdings of

Tucker Realty
- and Nelson is so obvi'ous t h at f urther comment as to ,
its impropriety is unnecessary. Consequently, Appendix "A" to
Respondents' Brief and all references in Respondents' Brief to
said Appendix "A" are beyond the record on appeal and hence
beyond consideration or entertainment by the Court.
POINT II
THE DEFAULT WAS NOT TIMELY CURED AND FORFEITURE IS
THE BARGAINED-FOR REMEDY.

Respondents contend that Buyers tendered to Appellant
all delinquent sums under the Contract within fifteen (15) days
after receiving the August 9, 1978 Notice of Default.

Neverthele;

Respondents have admitted that, if Paragraph llB applied to "all
amounts unpaid" under the Contract (whether or not currently due),
there has never been a sufficient tender of payment to cure the
existing defaults.

(R. 82, 83.)

1

Thus, the question of whether

the default was cured depends upon resolution of questions con·
cerning the interpretation of Paragraph llB.

To argue that the

admitted defaults were timely cured is merely to beg the question.
And if the default was not timely cured, forfeiture certainly
is one of the bargained-for remedies set forth in the Contract.
POINT III
THE REMEDY OF BARGAINED-FOR FORFEITURE IS REASONABJ!

AND PROPER.

J dgmen 1
Respondents' Brief and the trial court's Sunnnary u ·,

entirely misapprehend the law with respect to enforcement of the '
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forfeiture remedy in Uniform Real Estate Contracts.

Utah courts

have consistently held that forfeitures of land based upon this
or similar provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract are
generally enforceable.

It is critical, however, to distinguish

between those "forfeiture" provisions governing the release of
' the vendor from all obligations to convey the subject property
and those "forfeiture" provisions resulting in a loss of all
payments made or liquidated damages.

The Utah courts have developed

various principles and policies to ameliorate the sometimes harsh
effects of enforcing liquidated damages provisions.

But the

same courts have, except in very limited circumstances, consistently enforced the vendor's right to be released from any obligation to convey the subject property to the defaulting vendee.
Cases illustrating this distinction are collected under
Point III of Appellant's Brief on file herein.
1

These cases

demonstrate that the customary and most equitable course of
action is to release the vendor from any obligation to convey the
subject property but to award the vendee some measure of restitution where necessary to avoid a "penalty."
Respondents' Brief and the trial court's Summary Judgment
both fail to acknowledge these two very different facets of the
forfeiture provision.

Consequently, Respondents' assertion of

"windfall to Grow in excess of $200, 000. 00" (Respondents' Brief,
p. 16) is grossly overstated.

The record is entirely silent as

to the market value of the property.

Respondents' effort to argue

its case based upon unsupported and extravagant claims of market
1

value and "windfall" are improper and illustrate vividly the
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the defect in the judgment below.

The Surmnary Judgment must be
reversed and the case remanded to t h e trial court for a d t
e er.
mination first of Appellant's right to be released fro
m any
obligation to convey the property and second of Respondents'
right, if any, to restitution.
As to the favor with which forfeiture provisions generally are held in the law, it must be remembered that we are
dealing here with transactions in non-residential property amoni
sophisticated businessmen, not novices or uninformed consumer
victims.

Thus, the express remedial provisions of the parties'

bargained-for agreement should not be lightly ignored or comproo:
In Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P. 2d 712, 717
(1958), the Utah Supreme Court correctly explained the nature a.1:
scope of its function in resolving disputes arising under unifor:
real estate contracts:
It is not our
in and rene o·
tiate t e contract o t e parties.
t may e conce ed
that with an advantaged background we may be able to
improve on their work and considering the changed ~ime:
and conditions say what now appears to us to be fair
under such conditions. Possibly at least one of the
parties would agree. There is no reason why we shoulc
consider the vendee privileged and entitled to o~r .
intervention unless the conditions sought to be imposec
on the vendee are unconscionable. Equity should n~t
indulge in refinements and exact valuations at a time
subsequent to breach of recission. Further than ~o
determine if enforcement of the contract results 10 ld
grown inequity, and unless and until enfor7ement wou .
be highly unconscionable, we should recognize and, ~ono.
the right of persons to contract fr7ely and to, mf~n th
real and genuine mistakes when dealing at arms
g
(Emphasis Added.)
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH ll_!E
ERRONEOUS AND IMPROPER.
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1

I t is true that

11

[a] 11 parties submitted to the Court

that the language of the Contract [i.e. , Paragraph llB] was clear
and unequivocal.

11

(Respondents' Brief, p .16.)

What Respondents

failed to disclose, however, is that each party considered the
Paragraph llB language to have a clear and unequivocal meaning
directly conflicting with the clear and unequivocal meaning
attached to such language by the opposing party.
The parties have from the outset of litigation argued
explicitly about the interpretation of Paragraph llB.

Buyers'

Answer to Appellant's Complaint states that "ll(b) is ambiguous
and is subject to varying interpretations."

(R. 34.)

In the

hearing on Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, counsel for
Boardwalk and Phoenix asserted that Paragraph llB is "very clear
in its meaning, 11 and then explained:
We think it is clear that the words "on all
amounts unpaid" relate directly back to the words
"delinquent or in default" and that has to be
the clear intent of that provision and the clear
meaning of that language.
(R. 326-327.)

Counsel for Appellant argued contrariwise that:

It is clear that the 18 percent interest applied
to all unpaid amounts. It does not say "all amounts
presently due and owing." It does not say "any
delinquent amounts." It says "all unpaid amounts
under the contract." If I may draw [an] analogy,
that is connnon language in a promissory note that
interest is payable on all unpaid amounts. That
language is not construed to mean the amount that
is due that particular month, but all unpaid amounts
on the promissory note. It is clear that the l~
percent interest applied to all amounts both pr~n
cipal and interest anytime after default or delinquency.
(R. 330.)

The foregoing references evidence the very dive:i<se

meanings of Paragraph llB advanced by counsel for the parties
during litigation.
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In making his Ruling and Judgment in
the trial court,
Judge Sam did not state that the meaning of
Paragraph llB is
clear and unequivocal on its face.

Indeed, the language of the

Ruling seems to indicate the contrary, i.e. , that Paragraph llB
was ambiguous, thus requiring "interpretation."

Appellant submit

that the language of Paragraph llB means what all of the evidenci
in the record says it means, or that it is at least ambiguous,
creating a material issue of fact which cannot be disposed of by
sunnnary judgment.

(See Appellant's Brief, P.10-18.)

The evidence in the record, when viewed in the light
most favorable to Appellant, supports Appellant's construction of
Paragraph llB.

The testimony of David Grow and Stephen Thomas

shows that Appellant's interpretation was the one agreed upon
between Appellant and Buyers at the time the Contract was entereo
into.

Again, Respondents' argument that these affidavits are

not admissible in evidence simply begs the question.

Extrinsic

or parol evidence is certainly admissible to resolve ambiguous
contract language.
Ambiguity exists because reasonable minds may differ
as to the meaning of Paragraph llB.

Camp v. Deseret Mutual

Benefit Association, 589 P. 2d 780 (Utah 1979).

Since ambiguity
1

I

is a question of law, an appellate court is in the same position '
as a trial court to determine the existence of an ambiguity·
974
See, ~· Craig v. Hamilton, 213 Kan. 665, 518 P.2d 539 (1 )~
233
Beedle v. General Investment Co., 2 Wash.App. 594, 469 p .2d

· 1 court determ.;ned
there was no
Insofar as the tria
~
rt to hold as a matter
ambiguity,
Appellant urges the Supreme Cou
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of law that Paragraph llB is ambiguous and that the existence
of factual issues regarding its interpretation precluded summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in granting the Summary Judgment.
Respondents have failed to revute Appellant's argument that, if
the material facts concerning the interpretation of Paragraph llB
are resolved in favor of Appellant, Respondents did not timely
cure their admitted default and delinquency.

Forfeiture of the

subject property is the remedy bargained for between the parties
and is reasonable and proper under the circumstances.

The Court

should not rewrite the Contract or void its express provisions.
At worst, Paragraph llB is ambiguous as a matter of law, and
the existence of factual issues surrounding such ambiguity preclude
the Summary Judgment.
Summary Judgment should therefore be reversed and the
case remanded to the trial court for a trial on the factual
issues as to the parties' intended meaning of Paragraph llB and
other remaining issues.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of September 1980.
MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL

By

~A,-/)/);...____

1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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